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This thesis examines the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors 
and short term underpricing of initial public offerings, using a sample of 326 firms from the 
main listings of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. The thesis explores these 
relationships in the context of information asymmetry theories, which attempts to explain 
underpricing as a result of the parties involved having different information.  
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An initial public offering (IPO) is a hallmark event in the life cycle of any company. It is the 
process in which a firm offers ownership shares in its company to the wider public on the 
stock market for the first time, thereby transitioning from a private into a public entity. Due 
to its importance, IPOs have been a subject of much academic interest, resulting in numerous 
research papers related to various elements in the process of going public, such as the 
decision to go public (e.g. Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, 1998; Aggarwal, Krigman & 
Womack, 2001; Jain & Kini, 1994; Booth & Smith, 1986). 
Among these well-researched areas, one of the most noteworthy is research on the 
phenomenon that firms going public frequently experience positive returns on the first day of 
trading its stock. This regularity of positive first day return among listing firms indicates that 
there are mechanisms that make firms going public price their stock below the market value 
of the firm, thereby giving investors a discount and the firm leaving money on the table. The 
phenomenon of listing firms pricing their shares below their market price is most commonly 
referred to as short-term underpricing, or simply underpricing, in much literature. 
There are many theories on what causes underpricing, and scholars recognize that there is a 
multitude of different factors leading to its occurrence. Some researchers point to the 
relationship between institutions, such as lawmakers, regulators and banks, and marketplaces 
in their theories, most commonly referred to as institutional theories (e.g. Ibbotson, 1975; 
Tinic, 1988). Other authors (e.g. Rock, 1986; Ljungqvist, 2007) attempt to explain 
underpricing as a consequence of asymmetric information between the primary parties 
involved in the IPO, including the board of directors, resulting in agency costs. A third set of 
theories utilize behavioral economics, assuming irrational investors or bias among issuers 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). Finally, some authors view underpricing as a means for insiders to retain 
firm control through strategically allocating the shares (e.g. Brennan & Franks, 1997; Field 
& Karpoff, 2002). 
This thesis explores the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and 
the degree of underpricing in the context of information asymmetry theories. Using two of 
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the most prevalent information asymmetry theories, the winner’s curse theory and the 
signaling theory, the thesis whether board characteristic  
1.2 Research question 
The question that this thesis sets out to answer is whether certain characteristics of the board 
of directors can partake in explaining some of the underpricing that occurs in the Nordic 
Market. 
1.3 Outline 
To successfully resolve the research question at hand, it is necessary to build a cohesive 
theoretical foundation that manages to create a link between the characteristics of the 
corporate board and the determinants of short-term underpricing, and then test the 
hypothesized relationships between them. 
To accomplish this, the paper begins with a chapter reviewing relevant literature. In this 
chapter, the paper will first look at previous research on the relationship with board 
characteristics and short-term underpricing. The chapter then goes on to examine theory on 
the responsibilities and impact of the board of directors, before evaluating different 
theoretical perspectives that seeks to explain the role and behavior of the corporate board. 
The two next chapters explores the data that the thesis uses to explore the research question 
and explains the model and assumptions that will be used for this purpose. Finally, the thesis 
reviews and discusses the results from the regression, before concluding.  
1.4 Delimitations 
Due to the small size of its IPO market, the Icelandic stock exchange is not included in the 
study. The time frame is also limited to the time period 2001 to 2021, as it is difficult to 
gather the necessary information about IPOs occurring before this.   
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2. Background and literature review 
In this chapter, the paper will review literature related to the corporate board and IPO 
performance. It will begin by an assessment of previous research on the relationship between 
board characteristics and IPO underpricing. The second section will first look at why firms 
go public, the IPO process, and the parties involved. In the third section, the paper delves 
deeper into the concept of short-term underpricing and reviews theories on its causes in a 
governance context. The fourth and final section studies the role and responsibilities of the 
board of directors and the individual variables in the context of the information asymmetry 
theories. 
2.1 Previous Literature 
Although both short-term underpricing of IPOs (e.g. Miller & Reilly, 1987) and the 
relationships between board characteristics and firm performance (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003) has received much 
academic attention over the years, there are still relatively few who have combined the two 
topics and researched the relationship between short-term underpricing and the 
characteristics of the board of directors, and it has yet to be researched at all in the Nordics.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the published literature on the subject. From the table, it is 
evident that focus on the subject matter has shifted geographically from western countries 
towards Asian markets over the last decade, hereunder primarily to India and Indonesia. 
Considering how the business-environment in Western countries has changed much 
throughout these years, such as having seen a stark increase in female directorships, it should 
be of interest to put more focus on western countries once more. 
Table 1: Research on the relationship between board characteristics and underpricing 
Research on the relationship between board characteristics and underpricing 
Author(s) Variables Country 
Finkle (1998) Board size, affiliated top 20-venture capitalists, 
affiliated directors from prestigious underwriter, 
United States 
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reputation of affiliated university scientists, CEOs who 
were former university professors, CEOs who have a 
background in finance 
Howton, Howton & Olsen (2001) Board size, executive board members, non-affiliated 
non-executive board members, affiliated non-executive 
board members, number of annual meetings, executive 
share ownership, non-affiliated non-executive share 
ownership, affiliated non-executive share ownership,  
United States 
Certo, Daily, & Dalton (2001) Board size, board independence, board reputation, CEO 
duality 
United States 
Filatotchev & Bishop (2002) Non-executive directors, CEO duality, executive 
ownership, non-executive ownership 
United Kingdom 
Cohen & Dean (2005) Top management legitimacy, top management 
experience, industry experience, age, education 
United States 
Chahine & Filatotchev (2008) Board Independence, management ownership, 
management power 
France 
Anis (2010) Board size, board independence, CEO duality, audit 
committee, share retention among founders, managers, 
and family 
France 
Hearn (2011) Board size, board independence, CEO duality, founder 
CEO, board committees, retained share ownership 
West Africa 
Yatim (2011) Board size, board independence, CEO duality, board 
reputation, director shareholdings 
Malaysia 
Darmadi & Gunwan (2013) Board size, board independence Indonesia 
Thorsell & Isaksson (2014) Interlocking, founder participation, director experience, 
average tenure, employee representation, managerial 




Hidyat & Kusumastuti (2015) Board size, board independence, audit committee Indonesia 
Handa & Singh (2015) Gender diversity, board size, board independence, 
family related board members 
India 
Dolvin & Kirby (2016) Board size, outside directors, CEO duality United States 
Kubícek, Strouhal & Stamfestová (2017) Gender diversity, director age, director nationality, 
board size, board independence 
Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland & 
Slovenia 
Singh & Gupta (2018) Foreign directors, board independence, director 
education, professional associations, director age, 
tenure, interlocking, board size, board duality 
India 
Singh, Maurya & Mohapatra (2019) Gender diversity, board independence, board leadership India 
Tanjung, Juni, Subing & Lestari (2019) Board size, board independence, executive ownership Indonesia 
Arora & Singh (2020) Board size, board committees, board independence, 
gender diversity, director age, family related board 
members, interlocking 
India 
Setiawan, Prabowo, Trinugroho, & 
Noordin (2021) 
Board size, board independence, female representation Indonesia 
Teti & Montefusco (2021) Board size, board independence, gender diversity, board 
ownership 
Italy 
Rau, Sandvik & Vermaelen (2021) Board size, gender diversity, female director age, female 
bio length, skills 
United States 
  
Finkle (1998) was the first to examine the relationship between the board of directors and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings. He investigated how the size and composition of the 
corporate board affected the initial offering size and long-term aftermarket performance of 
firms in the United States biotechnology industry between 1980 and 1994 and found a 
moderately significant relationship between director expertise and underpricing. Howton, 
Howton, & Olsen (2001) was however the first to research the relationship between board 
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characteristics and short-term underpricing, studying a sample of 412 firms in listed in the 
U.S. between 1986 and 1994. The study divided director ownership into quartiles and could 
show that the share ownership among both executive and non-executive directors had a 
positive relationship with short-term underpricing, although with a stronger relationship for 
executives. Furthermore, the paper found a negative relationship with board size and a 
positive relationship with CEO duality. 
The size of the board of directors has perhaps been the most common research subject when 
looking at the relationship between the corporate board and underpricing, but results from 
previous studies is mixed. Howton et al. (2001) found a positive relationship between board 
size and underpricing, while Certo, Daily and Dalton (2001), who published their research 
on the U.S. market the same year, found a negative relationship between board size and 
underpricing. In the following years, several authors have found either a positive relationship 
(e.g. Li & Naughton, 2007; Anis, 2010; Isaksson & Thorsell, 2014) and a negative 
relationship (e.g. Yatim, 2011; Darmadi & Gunwan, 2013; Kubícek, Strouhal & 
Stamfestová, 2017).  
A less researched, but increasingly more popular subject, is the effect of female directors on 
underpricing. Isaksson and Thorsell (2014) were the first to research the subject, in their 
examination of the Swedish IPO market. Their research showed that female board members 
increased underpricing, although the results were not significant. Studies researching the 
subject in the following years all showed mixed, but insignificant results, expect from a 
paper by Kubícek et al. (2017) on the Central European market that gave resulted in a 
positive and significant relationship.  
2.2 Initial public offerings 
An initial public offering is the act where a private company offers its shares to the general 
public on a stock exchange for the first time, thereby transforming it from a private to a 
public company. To create a framework for understand underpricing, it is necessary to 
understand the fundamentals of the initial public offering. This section will therefore explore 
the motivation for why firms go public, the parties involved in the IPO, and the process 
itself. 
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2.2.1 Why companies go public 
Going public is both a time consuming and a costly process, yet still a desirable option for 
many firms (Ritter, 1998). According to Ritter and Welch (2002) are two primary reasons 
why firms choose to go public: The first is that the owners wish access to more capital from 
investors to fund further expansion. The second reason is to increase the liquidity of the firm 
by creating a market for the company shares to be traded in.  
2.2.2 The parties 
There are three primary parties involved that are fundamental in understanding the 
mechanisms at play in an initial public offering. The firm that issues the shares (the issuer), 
the company that does the due diligence and prepares any required documents (the 
underwriter), and the investors who bids on the issuing firms shares (the investors). The 
interaction between the three players are central elements in theories about underpricing and 
it is therefore of interest to explain their role in the IPO process. 
The issuer 
The issuer is the firm going public through the issue of shares on a stock exchange and is the 
primary catalyst of the IPO. The issuers’ primary goal with the IPO process is to maximize 
the proceeds by offering the stocks at a price that is neither too high, which would offput 
investors, or too low, which would be an indirect cost for the firm as they leave money on 
the table (Thornton, Adams & Hall, 2011). To achieve this goal, the issuers typical 
responsibilities is to enlist and cooperate with one or more underwriters throughout the 
process. 
The underwriter 
An underwriter is typically an investment bank, a commercial bank, or a large shareholder 
responsible for performing a due diligence on behalf of the issuing firm. The responsibility 
of the underwriter includes performing a due diligence investigation of the firm, assist the 
issuer in the pricing of the share, write the listing prospectus, marketing of the share, and file 
any necessary documents. 
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The investors 
Investors that operate in the financial market can broadly be divided in to two groups in 
accordance with the size and purpose of their investments. These two are individual 
investors and institutional investors. Individual investors, sometimes referred to as retail 
investors, typically buy a smaller number of shares for themselves and therefore have little to 
no effect on firm value. These investors are often considered amateurs, using non-
fundamental information and by some being considered gamblers (Martin & Wigglesworth, 
2021). Institutional investors on the other hand are larger entity such as banks, insurance 
companies or investment funds. These investors are often regarded as sophisticated and 
proficient in financial analysis and is expected to have an advantage over individual 
investors with regards to accessing information (Field & Lowry, 2009).  
2.2.3 The IPO process 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) describes the process of an IPO in four stages, typically 
lasting between four and eight months. According to them, the first stage in the process is the 
market selection, where the firm must decide on which stock market to issue the shares. This 
might involve choosing between listing on different national stock markets or on other 
nations stock markets.  
After deciding on a listing market, the second stage of the process is choosing one or more 
underwriters and an initial design of the prospectus. An underwriter is typically a firm 
specialized in services related to public listings. Larger companies going public often hire 
multiple underwriters, whom in turn often create syndicates when working on the IPO. In its 
work to prepare for the IPO, the underwriter or underwriter team perform due-diligence 
examinations. 
2.3 Short-term underpricing 
The first day return of a stock is defined as the percentage difference between its offering 
price and closing price on the first day of trading. When the first day return of an IPO-firm’s 
share is positive, it entails that it was priced below its market value. This is defined as short-
term underpricing (e.g., Rock, 1986; Booth & Chua, 1996; Daily et al. 2003).  
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Economists such as Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) discovered the tendency of firms to 
sell their shares well below market value when going public. This puzzled researchers, as 
underpricing signifies a direct transfer of wealth from the ex-ante share owners to the new 
external investors in the form of a discount (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). This discount is 
often described as “money left on the table”, signifying the money a firm misses out on by 
pricing itself too low, and is calculated as the first day returns multiplied by the number of 
shares offered (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). The discovery led to a plethora of authors 
documenting the occurrence of underpricing on different markets all over the world, creating 
a vast collection of empirical literature on it. With the empirical research came the 
theoretical literature trying to explain the reasons for its occurrence. From there on, the 
literature has become more sophisticated, with researchers empirically testing the 
relationships between underpricing and variables derived from different theories (Ljungqvist, 
2007).  
The library of literature on both the empirical evidence of underpricing and the theories of 
why it occurs is today quite mature, but the literature on theory-testing is less exhaustive, 
with markets yet to be tested and often inconclusive results. 
2.3.1 Evidence of underpricing 
Reilly and Hatfield (1969) documented the presence of systematic underpricing in the U.S. 
market between 1963 and 1965 and found this to average 20.2 percent. Stoll and Curley 
conducted a study in 1970 on the U.S. market, using data from the years 1957, 1959 and 
1963, and found underpricing to average 42.4 %.  
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (2021) compiled evidence of underpricing in 54 countries 
from different empirical research papers and presented their equally weighted average initial 
returns. Table 2 is an overview of the research results of 50 countries, excluding the Nordic 
countries. 
Table 2: Underpricing of non-Nordic IPOs 
Underpricing of non-Nordic IPOs 
Country Time Period Avg. Initial Country Time Avg. Initial 
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Return Period Return 
Argentina 1991-2018 5.7 % Mauritius 1989-2005 15.2 % 
Australia 1976-2018 19.8 % Mexico 1987-2017 9.9 % 
Austria 1971-2018 6.2 % Morocco 2000-2011 33.3 % 
Belgium 1984-2017 11.0 % Netherlands 1983-2017 13.3 % 
Brazil 1979-2019 29.6 % New Zealand 1979-2018 15.9 % 
Bulgaria 2004-2007 36.5 % Nigeria 1989-2017 12.8 % 
Canada 1971-2017 6.4 % Pakistan 2000-2013 22.1 % 
Chile 1982-2019 6.8 % Philippines 1987-2018 17.3 % 
China 1990-2020 170.2 % Poland 1991-2019 11.7 % 
Cyprus 1997-2012 20.3 % Portugal 1992-2017 11.5 % 
Egypt 1990-2017 9.4 % Russia 1999-2013 3.3 % 
France 1983-2017 9.7 % Saudi Arabia 2003-2011 239.8 % 
Germany 1978-2020 21.8 % Singapore 1973-2017 25.8 % 
Greece 1976-2013 50.8 % South Africa 1980-2018 17.2 % 
Hong Kong 1980-2017 44.5 % Spain 1986-2018 9.2 % 
India 1990-2020 84.0 % Sri Lanka 1987-2018 28.9 % 
Indonesia 1990-2020 56.0 % Switzerland 1983-2018 25.2 % 
Iran 1991-2004 22.4 % Taiwan 1980-2019 37.2 % 
Ireland 1991-2013 21.6 % Thailand 1987-2018 40.0 % 
Israel 1990-2006 13.8 % Tunisia 2001-2014 21.7 % 
Italy 1985-2018 13.1 % Turkey 1990-2014 9.6 % 
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Japan 1970-2020 48.8 % United Arab Emirates 2003-2010 270.1 % 
Jordan 1999-2008 149.0 % United Kingdom 1959-2020 15.7 % 
Korea 1980-2018 55.2 % United States 1960-2020 17.2 % 
Malaysia 1980-2019 50.3 % Vietnam 2005-2017 33.3 % 
 
As is evident from the table, underpricing is a global phenomenon with substantial economic 
effect.  
Underpricing has also been researched in the Nordic countries. Keloharju (1993) found 
evidence of Finnish IPOs between 1984 and 1989 being underpricing by 8.7 %. Emilsen, 
Pedersen and Sættem (1997) researched the Norwegian stock market between 1984 and 1996 
and found underpricing to be 12.5 %. Jakobsen and Sørensen (2001) found danish IPOs to be 
underpriced by 7.4 % between 1984 and 1988, and Schuster (2003) found Swedish IPOs to 
be underpriced by 18.46 % 
Table 3: Underpricing of Nordic IPOs 
Underpricing of Nordic IPOs 
Author(s) Time period Market Underpricing 
Keloharju (1993) 1984-1989 Finland 8.7 % 
Emilsen, Pedersen & 
Sættem (1997) 
1984-1996 Norway 12.5 % 
Jakobsen & Sørensen 
(2001) 
1984-1988 Denmark 7.4 % 
Schuster (2003) 1988-1998 Sweden 18.46 % 
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2.3.2 Theoretical perspectives on underpricing 
Much research has been done to understand what causes underpricing. In accordance with 
previous literature by Eckbo (2007) and Ljungqvist (2007) the theories are divided into four 
groups. These are asymmetric information theories, institutional explanations, ownership and 
control reasons, and behavioural theories. Information asymmetry theories attempts to 
explain underpricing because of uneven information between the parties involved, including 
the board of directors.  
Information asymmetry theories 
Several studies have found information asymmetry between the three IPO parties to be one 
of the main drivers of short-term underpricing, starting with Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). 
Information asymmetry theories attempt to explain underpricing as a result of asymmetric 
knowledge between the parties, resulting in non-optimal decision making. Several 
information asymmetry theories have been developed, but two of the most prominent ones 
are Rocks’ (1986) “winner’s curse”-theory and Ibbotson’s (1975) signaling-theory. 
The winners’ curse 
In his much-cited paper Why new issues are underpriced, Rock (1986) extrapolated 
Akerlof’s lemon problem to the IPO market and argued that underpricing occurs due to 
informational asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, resulting in what he 
names “the winners curse”. According to his model, informed investors have extensive 
knowledge of the value of IPOs and therefore only make bids on the shares of companies 
that they know are priced below their real value. Uninformed investors on the other hand, are 
unaware of the fair value of the listing companies, thus making bids on both underpriced and 
overpriced shares. As listing companies offer a finite number of shares to investors, they 
must ration their shares out to investors in cases of excess demand, sometimes increasing the 
number of shares offered by exercising what is known as an overallotment option. The result 
is that uninformed investors are allocated a lower portion of the high-demand underpriced 
shares and a higher portion of the low-demand overpriced shares. If the companies on 
average are fairly priced, the uninformed investors will in total receive many overpriced 
shares and few underpriced shares, thus having a negative expected return on investment. 
According to Rock, the IPO market requires the participation of both informed and 
uninformed investors to fill the listing subscriptions, and a negative expected investment 
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return will cause uninformed investors to withhold investing in the IPO market, thereby 
reducing the capital that IPO firms can raise from investors (Ljungqvist, 2007). To ensure 
the participation of both groups of investors, firms therefore need to underprice their shares 
so that the expected return on investment for uninformed investors is no longer negative.  
The model assumes the existence of information heterogeneity between the investors, 
meaning that they all have access to the same information. An implication of this model is 
that the bias towards informed investors increases with the uncertainty of the real value of 
the shares (the information asymmetry), thereby increasing the disadvantage of the 
uninformed investors and negatively impacting their expected returns. This increases the 
discount that firms must offer to keep the uninformed investors in the market and increases 
the money left at the table. Thus, underpricing increases with ex ante valuation uncertainty 
(Johnston & Madura, 2009). 
Signaling theory 
Signaling theory was initially developed by Spence (1973) in his paper Job Market 
Signaling, where he modelled how job applicants can reveal information about themselves to 
employers through signals, such as education. This revealed information reduces the 
employer’s ex ante uncertainty when investing in a new employee, making it simpler to 
distinguish between high ability employees and low ability employees.  
Signaling theory quickly expanded into the field of economics and IPO research. Ibbotson 
(1975) was the first to research the theory in an IPO context in his Leeland and Pyle (1977) 
expanded the research on the role of signals in the IPO market and found that companies that 
were expected to do well in the future should (high-quality issuers) send clear and reliable 
signals of their quality to the market, such as retaining a high degree of share ownership. 
They found that to ensure reliability, the signals should be costly to imitate for companies 
that are not expected to do well in the future (low-quality issuers). Daily et al. (2003) and 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) found that high-quality issuers may disclose private beneficial 
information about competitive dynamics and intended use of proceeds in the listing 
documents in order to communicate the firms true value.  
Daily et al. (2003) and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) argues that listing firms can use board 
characteristics and other corporate governance indicators to signal firm value to investors. 
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2.4 The board of directors 
The corporate board is a publicly listed corporation’s highest ranked and most visible 
governance mechanism (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996), 
consisting of a team of directors functioning as representatives of the owners, voted in by the 
shareholders at the company’s general assembly. In a contemporary business environment, 
the corporate board plays an important role in the long-term operations of companies, 
making decisions about recruitment and dismissal of company executives (Hermalin & 
Weibach, 1998), the strategic direction of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kemp, 2006; 
Tricker, 1984), initiation and implementation of organizational change, and access to and 
distribution of resources (Hillman, Canella & Paetzold, 2000; Hendry & Kiel, 2004). 
Additionally, corporate boards monitor top management to minimize agency costs and 
protect shareholder interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Schleifer & Vishny, 1997; Ingley & Van der 
Walt, 2001; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005; McIntyre, Murphy & Mitchell, 2007). 
2.4.1 Agency theories and the corporate board 
Agency theory derived out of research on property rights and contracts and has become a 
prominent theory used in economics to explain conflicting interests between two or more 
parties. In corporate governance, it is frequently used in discussions about the conflicting 
interests between shareholders and firm managers and the costs derived from this conflict 
between ownership and control. According to Fama and Jensen (1983) the biggest 
responsibility of the modern-day board of directors is to minimize these costs. 
The effectiveness of a corporate board in solving these complex and challenging 
responsibilities is shown to have a positive effect on the financial performance of the firm it 
governs and are among the key determinants of board effectiveness is its characteristics (.  
(Hawkins, 1997; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). 
Among the more commonly researched board characteristics is the size of the board, its 
independence and gender diversity, the director stock ownership and CEO duality (e.g. 
Bathula, 2008; Merendino & Melville, 2019; Pucheta-Martinez & Gallego-Alvarez, 2019).  
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Based on the frequent research and established relationships between the aforementioned 
characteristics and firm performance, it is only natural for these characteristics to be the 
subject of this paper. 
2.4.2 The board as a signal 
In an IPO-process, both the listing firm and the external investors face the challenge of 
information asymmetry (Rock, 1986). However, the two parties stand on different sides of 
the optimal solution. The firm on one hand reduces the information asymmetry by sending 
costly, but reliable signals of firm quality to the investors, while external investors on the 
other hand face costs when assessing the firm as a possible investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, & 
Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, & Sharfstein, 1991).  
Certo et al. (2001) claims that the quality of the board is an observable characteristic and 
Lawless, Ferris and Bacon (1998) argues that the quality of the top management and the 
board of directors is among the most reliable signal of the potential future quality of the firm. 
Certo (2003) and Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) both argue that investors scrutinize the 
corporate board in order to know if its directors are composed to maximize shareholder 
interests. This claim was further supported by Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, and Johnson 
(2008b) who found that effective corporate governance mechanisms provide assurance to 
investors that the company management will maximize firm profits instead of personal 
utility.  
This research indicates that investors care about the board’s ability to monitor the firm 
management. There must therefore be certain characteristics of the board of directors that 
signal an increased ability to do so.  
2.4.3 Board characteristics and hypothesis 
Among the most dominant issues discussed in the literature regarding the board of the 
directors is the size of the board, the constellation of dependent and independent directors, 
and the leadership structure of the board, and these variables have come to be seen as 
important determinants for the protection of shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Typically, scholars have considered certain board traits, such as a high proportion of 
independent directors or the separation of CEO and chairman, to be indicators of better 
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performance (Li & Naughton, 2007). However, as previously outlined, the empirical results 
are less conclusive. 
To better understand the importance of board characteristics and underpricing in the context 
of information asymmetry theories, it is of interest to extensively discuss previous research 
of each board characteristic to develop the theories that this thesis will test.  
Board size 
The size of the board of directors has received much attention in corporate governance-
research, resulting in an extensive library of literature on the subject. Research on the 
relationship between board size and underpricing of IPOs is however still relatively 
immature, as several studies have put the spotlight on smaller industry sectors or have 
experienced challenges tied to small sample sizes (Dolvin & Kirby, 2016). 
Empirical research on the relationship between board size and firm value is inconclusive. 
Dehaene, de Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001) found a positive relationship between firm value and 
the number of board members, and Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) found a negative 
relationship.  
Organizational theorists argue that the size of the board of directors can partake in mitigating 
the costs associated with the conflict between the owners and the management, as its size 
will affects its monitoring capabilities (Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et al. 2008). However, 
larger sized corporate boards might also result in poor communication and cooperation 
between the members, harming the monitoring abilities and general performance of the 
board. Hiner (1967) argues in favor of such theories, stating that the relationship between the 
size of the board and the performance of the firm is non-linear and concave, meaning that 
optimal number of directors is at a specific point on the curve. In an IPO context, the results 
from researching the relationship between board size and underpricing has been mixed, with 
studies finding positive relationships, negative relationships, and no relationships.  
On this basis, the study will research the following hypothesis.  




Nordic countries have seen a surge in women entering the boardroom in the last decade, with 
the social and political climate in the region being a catalyst for change. Today, more than 
one-third of all directors in the Nordic countries are women. A high number compared to the 
rest of Europe, and a number that is still growing. Out of the four countries, Norway is 
leading the way, with 44 % percent of board members being female and 20 % of public 
companies having female chairs (Spencer Stuart, 2021). 
With the gradual increase in female board members, their effect on firm performance has 
received more attention. Several researchers have found a positive relationship between 
female board representation and key financial indicators such as the return on total capital, 
gross profits, and ROE (Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; Joy, Carter, Wagner & 
Narayanan, 2007; Gao, 2018), while others have found a negative effect (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Bøhren & Strøm, 2007). 
Ahern & Dittmar (2012) researched the effect that the announcement that the gender quota 
laws in Norway had on the Tobin’s Q and found a significant reduction in the following 
years. This was however not necessarily due to gender, as the study concluded that reduced 
board capabilities were the cause of the drop in Tobin’s Q, as the new female board 
members on average were younger, had less experience, and had were less educated than 
their male counterparts.  
If women have an effect on firm performance by virtue of their gender, the question that 
arises is why they have an effect. One theory is that women and men are fundamentally 
different and therefore inherit different knowledge, experiences, and perspectives, resulting 
in gender diverse boards taking more well considered and ultimately better decisions (Dezsö 
& Ross, 2012). This was supported by Schwartz-Ziv (2013) who discovered that boards 
containing at least three members of each gender takes more initiative and requests 
information from management about twice as often as boards with less than three board 
members of each gender. Furthermore, Brown, Brown and Anastasopoulos (2002) found that 
gender diverse board would be more likely to focus on clear communications with 
employees, corporate social responsibility, and customer satisfaction. This can perhaps be 
explained by research conducted by Woolley et al. (2010), who found that a higher ratio of 
women in a group increases the groups social sensitivity. Additionally, women are on 
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average more risk averse than their male counterparts (Katz & McIntosh, 2016; Navarro & 
Gallo, 2014), which in turn should reduce firm risk.  This assumption is supported by Yang 
et al. (2019), who found that especially idiosyncratic risk was reduced with an increased in 
female directors.  
In a corporate governance perspective, Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen (1993) and Fondas 
and Sassalos (2000) argues that female board participation increases the monitoring 
capabilities of the board, as self-interests and groupthink is reduced with diversity. In the 
context of signaling theory, this indicates that the inclusion of female board members should 
demonstrate a reduction in agency problems to external investors therefore also reduce 
underpricing. Additionally, Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the presence of female 
directors sends out signals to investors about a firm’s distinct capabilities, which attracts 
certain investors. This is supported by Bilimora (2000) who claims that the inclusion of 
women in the top management signal that the firm show concern for equity and female 
empowerment, which communicates both the credibility and potential of the IPO firm. 
Although the effect of female board representation on firm performance is disputed, the 
research does indicate that female board members reduce investor uncertainty about the 
agency problems between shareholder interest and management interests. On these grounds 
and on the basis of previous research on the subject, the hypothesis that will be tested is the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The number of female directors has a negative relationship with 
underpricing 
Board independence 
Several authors have researched the effect of independent board members on firm 
performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found a positive relationship between the 
company stock price and the number of independent directors. This finding was later 
supported by in studies by both Peng, Buck and Filatotchev (2003) and Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008). Other studies by Christensen, Kent, and Stewart (2010), and Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1990) have found a negative relationship.  
In a study of 969 stock exchange listings in Europe between 1995 and 2011, Bertoni, Meoli, 
and Vismara (2014) found board independence to be a critical factor in external investors 
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valuation of the firms share when going public. They showed that director independence 
reduced underpricing by signalling improved effectiveness in monitoring top management.  
Several authors have used the percentage of independent directors as a measure of 
monitoring effectiveness (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Byrd & Hickman, 1992, Brickley, 
Coles & Terry, 1994). These studies hypothesised that a board with a majority of outside 
directors will have the ability to stop any actions from inside directors that would lower 
shareholder wealth. In their research they concluded that boards dominated by external 
directors are considered by external investors to be superior at monitoring than boards 
dominated by internal directors. 
However, several studies have found a positive relationship between the proportion of 
external directors and underpricing (Certo et al., 2001; Howton et al., 2001; Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002). The theorised explanation for this relationship is that a higher proportion of 
external directors’ functions as a signal to investors of higher firm quality, resulting in an 
increase in underpricing. 
On this basis it is assumed that an increase in external directors is viewed by external 
investors to reduce agency-problems and protect shareholder interests, thereby reducing 
underpricing. On this basis, the thesis will test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Board independence has a negative relationship with underpricing  
CEO duality 
CEO duality is a situation where a company’s CEO also holds the position of chairman of 
the board. This dual role is viewed by many scholars as a clear agency problem, as the CEO 
has the responsibility of monitoring him- or herself. Research on the separation of the two 
roles have shown that the potential ability of the board to reduce opportunism and 
objectively evaluate firm performance is lower when the CEO holds this dual role (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Hung (1998), an 
external chairman also increases the legitimacy of the board of directors. This increased 
legitimacy is likely not unfounded, as studies have shown that U.S. firms with CEO duality 
are more likely to face accounting and auditing enforcement actions from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Dechow et al., 1996) or litigation against their auditor (Goyal & 
Park, 2002). 
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By empirically showing that firms where the CEOs that do not also inhabit the role of 
chairman have a higher CEO turnover following low stock prices, Mary (2006) argues that 
the structure of the board of directors affects the disciplining of the firm’s CEO.   
 28 
3. Data 
This purpose of this chapter is first to explain the process that was used to gather and process 
the data, and then to present the descriptive statistics of the final data sample. 
3.1 Data selection 
For the thesis, I gathered data on XXX firms listed on the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and 
Finnish main stock exchange between 2001 and 2021. The data was primarily retrieved from 
two sources. Technical data such as listing dates, share prices and firm value was mainly 
gathered from SDC Platinum, while data on board characteristics was primarily gathered 
from the listing prospectus. Additionally, secondary sources were used to correct or 
supplement the data in cases were the primary sources lacked data or was incorrect. 
SDC Platinum 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Database is a database provided by Thompson 
Reuters. The database contains large quantities of historical data on financial transactions, 
hereunder IPOs. The program was used to retrieve information about the firm’s nationality, 
listing date, founding date, pricing technique, SIC code, industry, offering price, first day 
highest price, first day lowest price, and closing price. Due to uncovering incorrect 
observations on several occasions, SDC Platinum was not deemed to be completely reliable, 
and the data was therefore cross referenced with other sources that was considered more 
reliable, such as the stock exchange websites, Google Finance, Nordnet, prospectuses, and 
annual reports. 
Stock exhanges 
To ensure the reliability of the data, the historical stock information of the individual 
companies was downloaded from the stock exchange websites. Additionally, the historical 
stock information of the four main indexes was downloaded to calculate the daily market 
return, the 30-day market return, and the 30-day standard deviation.  
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Prospectuses 
The prospectuses were used to gather data about the characteristics of the board of directors, 
and was primarily retrieved from company websites, IPO databases, and by contacting the 
issuing firms or the underwriters. The prospectus design and content were mostly the same 
between the firms, although with some deviation, thereby demand the information to be 
retrieved elsewhere.  
Several firms published information about board members that would leave or join the board 
right before or after the IPO date in the prospectus. In all these cases, the firm included the 
same information about those that would join as those already on the board. As theory stated 
that external investors view the board as a signal of future shareholder earnings, it was 
considered meaningful to include oncoming board members, as they can have an impact on 
shareholder earnings, and exclude departing board members, as they directors would have 
limited to no impact. 
Two issues arose when gathering prospectus information. First, the extent of available 
information gradually decreased with the age since the IPO occurred. It was more difficult to 
get a hold of the older prospectuses, and in many cases, these also lacked the relevant 
information. Second, Finnish prospectuses were mostly published only in Finnish, requiring 
translation using Google Translate. 
Other sources 
Data on ex ante total assets was retrieved from the prospectuses, intermediary reports, and 
annual reports of the listing companies. As the currency used in these presentations varied 
between Norwegian Kroner, Swedish Kroner, Danish Kroner, Euros, and US Dollars, it was 
necessary to transform the data to one common currency to analyse it. The currency of 
choice was the US Dollar. Historical currency prices were downloaded from DNB Markets 
and used to convert the total assets. Furthermore, to adjust the total assets for inflation, 
monthly consumer price index data for the four countries were retrieved from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Finally, monthly data on consumer confidence was retrieved 
from the European Commission Flash Consumer Confidence Indicator. 
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In cases where necessary information was absent from the prospectus or needed to be cross 
referenced with other sources due to uncertainty, information was gathered from the firms’ 
intermediary reports, annual reports, annual report summaries, or Proff Forvalt. 
3.2 Excluded data 
Foreign-registered companies listed on the Nordic stock exchanges were excluded from the 
data set. Several companies were also excluded due to missing data on share prices or board 
characteristics. 
 31 
4. Research design and methodology 
The thesis seeks to explore the relationship between characteristics of the board of directors 
and short-term underpricing by testing hypothesis developed in the context of information 
asymmetry theories. This chapter will present the research design and the method that will 
be used to test the hypothesis presented in the previous chapter.  
4.1 Hypothesis development 
Founded on the knowledge on underpricing and corporate governance laid out in the 
previous chapter, a set of hypotheses have been developed for testing. The hypotheses are all 
derived from information asymmetry theory, and it follows from this that firms can use 
board characteristics as a signal to external investors of both the quality of the firm and the 
ability of the board of directors to affect agency conflicts between investors and firm 
management, thereby reducing or increasing the necessary degree of underpricing. 
The first hypothesis that will be tested is the relationship between the size of the board of 
directors and underpricing.  
4.2 Regression variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
In accordance with previous research (e.g., Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Pham et al., 2001) the 
dependent variable that should be used to measure underpricing is the market adjusted first-
day returns, which utilizes the following formula: 
 
Where MAR denotes the listing firms’ first-day market adjusted returns, P1 denotes the first 
day closing price of the share, OP denotes the offer price of the share, and M0 and M1 is the 
opening and closing values of the selected market. If the market adjusted return is positive, it 
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means that the IPO firms’ stock is underpriced and it if is negative it means that the stock is 
overpriced. Mathematically, we can define the three possible states as following: 
Underpricing:   MAR > 0 
Fair pricing:   MAR = 0 
Overpricing:  MAR < 0 
To proxy the market returns, the paper uses the average returns from the main indexes of the 
four stock exchanges.  
4.2.2 Independent variables 
The variable used to measure the size of the board of each firm is denoted BS and is simply 
the number of directors at the date of the IPO. The variable for gender diversity is denoted 
GD and is the proportion of female directors at the board. Board independence is denoted BI 
and is the proportion of external directors at the board. The variable DUO is a categorical 
variable, where 1 equals CEO duality and 0 does not. Finally, the variable INTERLOCKING 
is the average number of board memberships held by each member of the bord at other 
companies, functioning as a proxy for experience and reputation in the corporate world. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
To avoid spurious correlations in the regression analysis, this study uses several control 
variables that are believed to affect underpricing. Previous literature on underpricing have 
used several different control variables, such as systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Bernile, 
Bhagwat & Yonker, 2018; Perryman, Fernando & Tripathy, 2016), ROA (Matsa & Miller, 
2013), Tobins’s Q, and price-to-book ratio (Post & Byron, 2015). Using the correct control 
variables can contribute by increasing the robustness of the analysis but using incorrect 
variables can have the opposite effect (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). This study will use the five 
control variables LNASSETS, LNAGE, CCI, MC, PRICING, INTERNATIONAL, RANK, 
and TECH. 
In accordance with previous literature (e.g. Certo et al., 2001; Ritter, 1984; Ljungqvist, 
2004) the paper utilizes the natural logarithm of firm size and firm age. Firm size is in this 
case the total assets of the firm as published in the IPO prospectus, adjusted for inflation 
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using the consumer price index in the four countries. The age of the firm is simply the 
natural logarithm of the IPO date less the founding date of the firm. 
Studies have also shown that the IPO market experiences periods of overoptimism, with a 
stark increase in both the number of IPOs and short-term returns. In periods of 
overoptimism, the market is often labelled as “hot”, and several models based on the theories 
of asymmetric information consider this a period where the cost of asymmetric information 
to be at its lowest (Helwege et al, 2002). One example of this is the model developed by 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), which predicts that a “hot” market occurs when firms 
experience a positive shock to expected future earnings. When this is not the case, the 
market is labelled as “cold” (Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998; Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975; McBain & 
Krause, 1989). This study defines a market as “hot” when the number of IPOs in a quarter is 
above the average number of IPOs and otherwise as “cold”.  
When deciding on the issue share price, Nordic firms primarily choose between either using 
the book-building method or the fixed price method. Previous studies on the relationship 
between the choice of pricing method and the degree of underpricing found that using book-
building resulted in considerably less underpricing compared to the fixed pricing method 
(Ljungkvist, Jenkinson, & Wilhelm, 2003). To control for this effect the model includes the 
categorical variable PRICING, where 0 equals a firm using the book-building method and 1 
that the firm uses the fixed pricing method. Based on the research of Ljungkvist et al. (2003) 
the relationship with the dependent variable is expected to be positive. 
4.2.4 Omitted variables 
Even though this study uses many control variables to decrease the risk of spurious relations, 
IPO underpricing is a complex matter likely decided by a very large number of factors and 
the number of control variables that can be included in the study is limited.   
 
4.2.5 OLS Assumption 
In order to explore the relationship between underpricing and the independent variables of 
our model, this thesis will utilize a linear multiple regression analysis, which is a commonly 
used method in econometric research. The method does this by finding a linear relationship 
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between the dependent variable, in this case underpricing, with the independent variables. 
This method is dependent on certain assumptions, not being violated 
To ensure valid hypothesis testing when using OLS, it is necessary to that the methods five 
main assumptions are fulfilled. If this is not the case, there is a risk of m 
Assumption 1: Linearity 
The first assumption defines the model and claims that the population model estimating the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables should be written 
as: 
 
Assumption 2: Random sampling 
The second assumption of the model is that there is a random sampling of observations, 
meaning that they must be drawn randomly from a population of n observations. 
Assumption 3: No perfect collinearity 
The third assumption is that there should be no exact linear relationship between the 
independent variables. 
Assumption 4: Zero conditional mean 
The average variance of the error term is constant along the X-axis. The assumption can be 
written as: 
 
According to the theorem, the OLS-estimators are BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) 
when the five assumptions hold. 
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5. Results and analysis 
In this part I will discuss the descriptive statistics of the analysed data and the results of the 
regression. The data and results will be analysed both as a whole and for each individual 
country.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 MAR 327 .045 .14 -1.001 .95 
 BS 327 6.483 1.945 3 12 
 GD 327 .244 .155 0 1 
 BI 327 .779 .215 0 1 
 DUO 326 .202 .402 0 1 
 INTOWNERSHIP 327 .001 .007 0 .13 
 EXTOWNERSHIP 327 .001 .003 0 .042 
 AC 327 .878 .328 0 1 
 NC 327 .92 .303 0 3 
 INTERLOCKING 327 5.309 2.972 .4 24.625 
 LNASSETS 327 5.411 1.857 -1.615 11.662 
 LNAGE 327 2.585 1.118 0 5.298 
 CCI 327 -9.977 6.915 -31 .6 
 MC 246 .74 .44 0 1 
 PRICING 327 .284 .452 0 1 
 INTERNATIO~L 327 .19 .393 0 1 
 RANK 327 .722 .449 0 1 




Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in 
the regression model. There was an average of 16 IPOs per year on the main exchanges in 
the Nordics between 2001 and 2020, and as shown in figure ??? the number varied 
considerabily during these years. 
Figure 1: IPOs per year 
 
As we can see from the summary statistics, the average underpricing on the main Nordic 
stock exchanges is 4.48 %. Comparing this number to the results from previous studies in 
other countries, it becomes clear that the Nordic main listing IPOs has a relatively low 
degree of underpricing.  




The average number of board directors across the four countries during the select period has 
been 6.5, with all four countries averaging somewhere between 6 and 7 members. The four 
markets also have an average representation of female directors of 24.4 %, with Norway 
having the highest representation of 29,8 % and Denmark having the lowest of 12,7 %.  





In order to know if the regression assumptions hold, it is critical to test the spread of the 
dataset and test the model specification. The variables and the model will therefore be tested 
for normality, collinearity, homoscedasticity, and independence.  
5.2.1 Normality 
Residual normality is required to conduct hypothesis testing when using OLS-regression, as 
this ensures that the p-values are valid. If this is not the case, we cannot conclude on our 
findings as the p-values cannot be used to ensure how likely it is that the coefficient values 
are not zero (Kim, 2015). Normality involves the residuals being identical and spread 
independently. To visually assess if the assumption of normality holds it is necessary to 
estimate the residuals of the regression and then use these values to graph a normal 
probability plot and a Q-Q plot, as shown in figure 4 and 4. 
Figure 4: Normal probability plot   Figure 5: Q-Q-plot 
 
A normal distribution of the residuals is indicated by the linear pattern in both the normal 
probability plot and the Q-Q plot, whereas the normal probability plot is sensitive to reduced 
normality in the middle of the data set, while the Q-Q plot is sensitive to reduced normality 
in the tail ends of the plot. Both graphs show some sign of a non-linear distribution, but these 
are so small that it is most likely is safe to claim that the residuals are normally distributed. 
To confirm this, the Shapiro-Wilk W-test is also conducted on the residuals. The test has a 
null hypothesis that the residual spread, denoted r, is normally distributed. The result of the 
test is shown in table 5 below. 
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Table 5: Shapiro-Wilk W test 
 
As table 5 shows, the hypothesis is not significant and can therefore not be rejected. The 
result of these tests clearly indicates that the residuals are normally distributed. 
5.2.2 Homoskedasticity 
To test if the assumption of homoskedasticity holds a Breusch-Pagan test is conducted. The 
method tests the null hypothesis that there is constant variance in the error term, and as 
figure 4 shows the null hypothesis is rejected for the test, and homoskedasticity can therefore 
be assumed 
Figure 4: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
 
5.2.3 Multicolinearity 
If two or more independent variables are highly correlated with each other, the estimates of 
the regression model become unstable, and the standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients can be blown out of proportion. A common method of testing for 
multicollinearity is by estimating the variance inflation factor (VIF). The rule of thumb for 
this method is at any variable with a VIF-value above 10 or a 1/VIF-value below 0.1 requires 




Table 6: VIF-test 
     VIF   1/VIF 
 MC 2.081 .48 
 CCI 1.761 .568 
 BI 1.687 .593 
 DUO 1.59 .629 
 NC 1.575 .635 
 AC 1.516 .66 
 LNASSETS 1.489 .671 
 BS 1.44 .695 
 INTOWNERSHIP 1.306 .765 




 RANK 1.268 .788 
 LNAGE 1.252 .799 
 EXTOWNERSHIP 1.168 .856 
 PRICING 1.164 .859 
 TECH 1.139 .878 
 INTERLOCKING 1.133 .883 
 Mean VIF 1.421 . 
As is clear from the table, there are no indications of multicollinearity among the variables. 
5.2.4 Model specification 
Model specification errors can occur when relevant variables are omitted, or irrelevant 
variables are included in the model. In cases where relevant variables are omitted from the 
model, their variance can be included in the estimated coefficients of included variables. 
And when irrelevant variables are included in the model, they can be attributed with the 
variance they share with other included variables. These forms of specification errors can 
have a large impact on the estimated regression coefficients. To test the specification of the 
model the thesis will use the Ramsay RESET-test, which tests the null hypothesis that the 
model has no omitted variables. The results from the RESET-test are presented in figure 5. 
Figure 5: Ramsay RESET 
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As figure 5 shows, the test is not significant and the hypothesis that the model is correctly 
specified can therefore not be rejected. It can therefore be assumed that the model that 
utilized in this study is specified correctly. 
5.3 Regression results 
In this section I will present and discuss the results from the regression. The first part of the 
section will present the results from the regression of the full sample of IPOs across the four 
countries and for each individual country. The second part of this subchapter will discuss the 
results of the regression in relation to the theoretical foundation and hypotheses previously 
presented.  
5.3.1 Full sample 
The result from regressing the full sample is shown in table 7. Initially, we see that the value 
of the F-statistic is 0.000, indicating that the overall model is significant at a 1 % level. The 
regression also has an adjusted R-squared of 0.174, indicating that the model explains 17.4 
percent of the variance in the market adjusted return. The table shows the regression 
coefficients for each of the independent variables, with their value indicating the numeric 
relationship it has with the dependent variable. The significance level of the relationship 
between each independent variable and the market adjusted return is presented using 
asterixis next to the coefficient values. Additionally, the standard deviation of the coefficient 


























































The regression output shows that the coefficient for the size of the board of directors is 
significant at a 1 % level and negative with a value of -0.006. This result tells us that an 
increase in board directors is correlated with a lower degree of underpricing. The coefficient 
for gender diversity is also negative, but only significant at a 10 % level. Board 
independence is significant at a 5 % significance level, and has a positive relationship with 
underpricing, indicating that an increase in independent board directors result in a higher 
degree of underpricing. CEO duality has a marginally positive relationship with underpricing 
of 0.001, indicating that firms with CEOs that also hold the role as chairman of the board is 
expected to experience a 0.1 % higher degree of underpricing. Of the three committee 
variables used in the regression, only the audit committee variable was within a 10 % 
significance level, having a negative relationship with underpricing of -0.033. Finally, 
interlocking has a positive relationship with underpricing of 0.1 % as well, with the 
regression result being significant at a 5 % significance level.  
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6. Discussion of results 
In this chapter I will discuss the empirical results from the regression in relation to the 
theoretical foundation and hypothesis presented previously. The chapter begins by 
discussing the results from each of the variables tested. It will then move on to discuss the  
6.1.1 Board size 
The hypothesis for the regression of board size was that it would have a relationship with 
underpricing, and the results is therefore in line with this. The hypothesis did not specify the 
direction of the relationship, as neither the literature or previous empirical research showed 
any direction clearly. The negative relationship for the full sample is very marginal with a 
coefficient value of -0.006, indicating that an increase of one director reduces underpricing 
with 0.6 %.  
The ambiguity of the relationship is further confirmed by looking at the regression results 
from the individual countries, where Norway and Finland have highly significant negative 
coefficient values, Sweden has a significant positive value, and Denmark has a negative but 
non-significant value.  
There are many possible explanations for why the relationship between board size and 
underpricing is so inconclusive. In the context of information asymmetry theories, the board 
size might indicate an increased ability to monitor the firm’s management and reduce agency 
costs. On the other hand, an increased number of directors might signal to   
6.1.2 Gender diversity 
The relationship between the number of female board members and underpricing is negative, 
indicating that an increase in female board members reduces the degree of underpricing. This 
result is in line with the theory and null hypothesis presented in the second chapter. The 
inclusion of female board directors might bring a different set of characteristics to the table, 
whereas women in general are believed to have inherent qualities that signal a reduction in 
agency costs, thus reducing the firms short-term underpricing. 
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This result is particularly interesting due to the Nordic countries status as among those 
leading the charge as more and more women enter the boardroom. The result from this study 
gives an indication on the sentiment among external investors towards an increase in female 
board members.  
Looking at the different effects of increased female representation in the four countries 
provides some further insight into its relationship with underpricing.    
6.1.3  Board independence 
The result of the regression indicates that an increased proportion of external directors 
results in increased underpricing. This is not in accordance with the null hypothesis of this 
thesis and the empirical results from Bertoni et al. (2014). The results do however support 
the results from Certo et al. (2001a), Howton et al. (2001), and Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002) who also found a positive relationship. They theorize that a higher proportion of 
independent directors’ signal higher firm quality compared to a board with a lower 
proportion of independent directors, thereby increasing the amount of underpricing. 
6.1.4 Director ownership 
The percentage amount of ownership was calculated for both internal and external directors, 
with the expected results being that increased share ownership would further align the 
interests of the board members with the shareholders, thereby reducing the degree of 
underpricing occurring. Unfortunately, the regression results were not statistically significant 
for neither the full sample nor the individual countries. One interesting point that was 
observed when working with the data, was that the degree of share ownership among board 
members for IPO firms was very low compared to some of the other studies performed on 
the share ownership.  
In the context of this thesis, a low share ownership percentage should not have a great deal to 
say for its effect on underpricing, as this number does not tell us much about how the wealth 
transfer that underpricing represents affects the board directors. A higher percentage share 
ownership does not necessarily entail a higher loss of wealth for a director.  
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6.1.5 CEO Duality 
CEO duality has a slight positive relationship with underpricing. In the context of signalling 
theory, this is an expected result, as it might signal that the chairman of the board is more 
aligned with firm management than with investors. 
6.1.6 Board committees 
Among the three committee-variables, only the audit committee was statistically significant 
for the full sample regression, albeit only at a 5 % level. The results showed a negative 
relationship with underpricing, which is in line with the presented hypothesis. One of the 
reasons why the presence of an audit committee reduces underpricing might be because it is 
adding an additional board for monitoring both the board of directors and the firm 
management. The explanation for why the audit committee might have an effect on 
underpricing while neither the remuneration committee nor the nomination committee might 
not, can perhaps be found in the perceived nature of the committee. The audit committee 
might send a signal of responsible governance to investors, thereby requiring less 
underpricing.  
6.1.7 Interlocking 
For each increase in the average external board memberships among directors, underpricing 
increases by 0.1 %. Interlocking being positively related to underpricing might be due to 
external directorships signaling to investors that the firm is of high quality. In this case, it 
might also be the opposite, that high quality firms that afford to price themselves below 
market values also are those firms with many experienced directors. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Although IPO underpricing has been a much-researched subject, the relationship it has with 
the characteristics of the board of directors has yet to be exhaustively researched, and this is 
the first the subject has been researched in the context of the Nordic IPO market. 
The goal of the thesis was to research whether certain characteristics of the board of 
directors had a relationship with short-term underpricing of underpricing in the context of 
information asymmetry theories, which revolves around the idea that underpricing can be 
partially explained as a product of uneven information between the players involved, which 
entails that underpricing can be affected by providing investors with information through so-
called signals. The characteristics chosen for this research was the size of the board of 
directors, the proportion of female directors, the proportion of external directors, the external 
and internal share ownership, CEO duality, board committees, and the number of outside 
directorships. On the basis of information asymmetry theories and results from previous 
research, I developed hypotheses to be empirically tested.  
By gathering and analysing data from 326 IPOs across the main exchanges of Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, I have found evidence that the characteristics of the board 
of directors do play a role in the degree of short-term underpricing of IPOs, although to a 
relatively small degree. In line with the established hypothesis, an increased number of 
directors resulted in less underpricing across the whole sample. However, analysing each 
individual market, the results were more ambiguous, with two of the markets having 
negative relationships, one having a positive relationship, and one being insignificant. This 
ambiguity is theorized to stem from the relationship being non-linear and concave with there 
being an optimal number of directors that signals the board’s ability to both monitor 
management and communicate properly. Furthermore, an increase in female directors was 
related to reduced underpricing, perhaps due to it signalling improved monitoring 
capabilities to external investors, as women bring different characteristics to the corporate 
board. Board independence was found to have a positive relationship with underpricing, 
indicating that boards with a higher proportion of external directors have more underpricing 
than boards with a lower proportion, perhaps due to it signalling higher firm quality.  
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